

# What's New in CICS Security

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What's New in  
CICS TS 5.6  
CICS TS Open Beta

Enhancements to TLS

Scenarios and Best Practices

Monitoring and Preventing  
Threats

Simplification and Improved  
Diagnostics

Outbound SNI Support

TLS 1.3†

Replacing outbound default ciphers

† CICS TS Open Beta

Enhancements to TLS

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SNI allows a server with a single ip address and port to host multiple secure websites, each with their own server certificate.

E.g. Amazon (AWS)

### **CICS TS supports SNI as a client**

SNI supported rather than required

- Used if server supports it
- No configuration

Server Name Indication (SNI) was introduced with Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 6066

- RFC 6066 is a companion document to RFC 5246 that described TLS 1.2.
- RFC 5346 superseded an earlier description of SNI in RFC 3546.

Backported to CICS TS 5.3 in APAR PH20063

# Without SNI support

DNS

A.SERVER.IBM.COM=9.20.5.1  
B.SERVER.IBM.COM=9.20.5.1

CICS TS

• EXEC CICS WEB OPEN  
URIMAP(ASERVER)

URIMAP(ASERVER)  
HOSTNAME(A.SERVER.IBM.COM:8880)

TLS  
HANDSHAKE  
MESSAGES

CLIENT HELLO TLS  
EXTENSION:  
HOSTNAME =  
A.SERVER.IBM.COM:8880

SERVER HELLO SERVER  
CERTIFICATE:  
SERVER-2048-CERTIFICATE

SNI enabled server

Server

Virtual Host A

9.20.5.1:8880

Virtual Host B


EXEC CICS WEB OPEN  
URIMAP(BSERVER)

URIMAP(BSERVER)  
HOSTNAME(B.SERVER.IBM.COM:8880)

CLIENT HELLO TLS  
EXTENSION:  
HOSTNAME =  
B.SERVER.IBM.COM:8880

SERVER HELLO SERVER  
CERTIFICATE:  
SERVER-2048-CERTIFICATE

# With SNI Support



## TLS 1.3

### Major change to TLS

3 new ciphers for 1.3

Ciphers incompatible with TLS 1.2

### Performance changes

Single handshake

More secure algorithms

Change to caching

## RFC 8446 approved in Aug 2018

1301 TLS\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256

1302 TLS\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384

1303 TLS\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305\_SHA256

# External Changes

## SIT Changes

- MINTLSLEVEL={TLS11,TLS12,**TLS13**}
- **MAXTLSLEVEL**={TLS11,TLS12,**TLS13**}

### Removed

- ENCRYPTION=
- MINTLSLEVEL=TLS10, TLS10ONLY

## CIPHERS option on resources

IPCONN, TCPIPSERVICE and URIMAP

Defaults to **defaultciphers.xml** rather than numeric ciphers

### Deprecated / Removed

- Numeric ciphers

**USSCONFIG** must have the following file

**/security/ciphers/defaultciphers.xml**

# MAXTLSLEVEL<=TLS 1.2

# MAXTLSLEVEL=TLS13

Numeric ciphers no longer supported

All definitions must use xml files

Change/Install numeric ciphers will fail

```
MAS 2 - MVS 2d
OVERTYPE TO MODIFY                                CICS RELEASE = 0740
CEDA Alter Ipconn( ZOE3 )
+ Autoconnect ==> Yes                               No | Yes
  INservice   ==> Yes                               Yes | No
SECURITY
SSl          ==> Yes                               No | Yes
CERTificate  ==>                                     (Mixed Case)
CIPHERs      ==> 3538392F3233
(Mixed Case)
Linkauth     ==> Secuser                            Secuser | Certuser
SECurityname ==> GALLEN
Userauth     ==> Defaultuser                        Local | Identify | Verify | Defaultuser
IDprop       ==> Notallowed                          Notallowed | Optional | Required
RECOVERY
Xlnaction    ==> Keep                               Keep | Force
MIRROR TASK PROPERTIES
MIRRORlife   ==> Uow                                Request | Task | Uow
DEFINITION SIGNATURE
+ DEFInetime : 01/12/11 17:45:04
W CIPHERS ATTRIBUTE CONTAINING NUMERIC CODES IS DEPRECATED.
                                                    SYSID=ZOE2 APPLID=IYK4ZOE2
                                                    DSN=GALLEN.ALLAPPL.DFHCS
PF 1 HELP 2 COM 3 END          6 CRSR 7 SBH 8 SFH 9 MSG 10 SB 11 SF 12 CNCL
MA B
```

Change/Install numeric cipher give warning

Blanking out sets default to **defaultciphers.xml**

MAXTLSLEVEL<=TLS 1.2

EXEC CICS WEB OPEN CIPHERS(353839)  
<URIMAP(urimap)>

Warning messages issued

- Once per program issuing command

Existing requests still honoured

New translate will fail

MAXTLSLEVEL=TLS13

EXEC CICS WEB OPEN ~~CIPHERS(353839)~~  
<URIMAP(urimap)>

CIPHERS option ignored

Warning messages issued

Once per program issuing command

CIPHERS from URIMAP (if specified)

Otherwise defaultciphers.xml used

# Migration to using TLS 1.3

Upgrade to z/OS 2.4

Upgrade to CICS TS Open Beta

- Copy and customise defaultciphers.xml

Prepare RDO definitions

- All resources must use xml files in CIPHERS
- TLS 1.3 ciphers must be included

Upgrade certificates

- RSA key size at least 2048 bits
- ECC keys size at least 256 bits

Then set MAXTLSLEVEL=TLS13

It is important to upgrade all definitions to use cipher files.

This will make it easier for compliance

All ciphers will be defined in USSCONFIG

If any ciphers are found to have security flaws it can be changed in one place

## Replacing outbound default ciphers

Override the system supplied default 2 digit ciphers (a very limited set)

Used on

EXEC CICS WEB OPEN

EXEC CICS INVOKE SERVICE

Replace with defaultciphers.xml

CD Item on CICS TS 5.6

PH38091

Feature toggle to enable

`com.ibm.cics.web.defaultcipherfile=true`

CICS security documentation  
restructure with best practices †

Health Checks for conformance  
to best practice †

† CICS TS Open Beta

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## CICS security documentation restructure

### Objectives

**Education** on concepts and terminology

Aimed at new joiners

**Advice** on security in application architecture scenarios

Aimed at application architects

Security **configuration tasks** for these scenarios

Aimed at new sysprogs

Clear **Best Practice** advice and **Recommendations**

## CICS TS Open Beta

IBM Docs has a mixture of old and new

How it works

Identification

Authentication

Authorization

Confidentiality and Integrity

Auditing

Initial scenarios

Web Services

Liberty

IPIC

# Rewrite and Restructure of CICS Security Documentation

## Designing security for IPIC

Search in this product...



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### – Securing - new doc

What does security mean for CICS?

CICS security is a team sport

+ How it works: identification in CICS

+ How it works: authentication in CICS

+ How it works: authorization

How it works: auditing

+ Security for SOAP web services

### – Security for IPIC (IP interconnectivity)

+ How it works: CICS IPIC Security

### – Designing security for IPIC

Design example: Securing CICS-to-CICS with an IPIC connection within a sysplex

Design example: Securing CICS-to-CICS with an IPIC connection that uses TLS

Design example: Securing client-to-CICS with a trusted IPIC connection

Design example: Securing client-to-CICS with an IPIC connection that uses TLS

Configuring security for IPIC

+ Security for CICS Liberty

+ Auditing CICS

IPIC connections can be used in many scenarios. Connections can be trusted or untrusted. To secure connections, you must choose options that are the best for you. Examples illustrate some recommended options.

For information on configuring security for IPIC, see the following topics:

## Security design considerations

When you design security for CICS web service pages, you must consider the following:

- Authentication and identification
- Authorization
- Confidentiality and integrity
- Trust
- Audit

These considerations are explored as follows.

## Authentication and identification

Education section on concepts

- Signaled with “How it works: ..”

Capability sections in consistent format

- How it works
- Designing
- Configuring


Design examples for common configurations

- Unrecognizable from previous doc
- Redirects get your bookmarks to new pages

# Design Example Diagrams

Figure 1 shows an overview of the scenario.

Figure 1. IPIC trusted connection between systems in the same sysplex



- Examples with diagrams of security information
- Standard diagrams with
  - RACF profile and permissions
  - UserIDs in flow
  - System Management Resources and security attributes
- Numbered flow of security information

The following security flows occur at the points shown:

1. Transaction TX01 running in the TOR links to a program in the AOR over the IPCONN that connects the two regions and flows its task user ID to the AOR.
2. Identification of the transaction in the AOR is controlled by the USERAUTH(IDENTIFY) setting on the AOR's IPCONN definition which allows the identity to be set to the flowed user ID from the TOR. The flowed user ID from the TOR becomes the *asserted-userid* in the AOR.

## – Securing - new doc

What does security mean for CICS?

CICS security is a team sport

- + How it works: identification in CICS
- + How it works: authentication in CICS
- + How it works: authorization
- How it works: auditing

+ Security for SOAP web services

## – Security for IPIC (IP interconnectivity)

+ How it works: CICS IPIC Security

## – Designing security for IPIC

### Design example: Securing CICS-to-CICS with an IPIC connection within a sysplex

Design example: Securing CICS-to-CICS with an IPIC connection that uses TLS

Design example: Securing client-to-CICS with a trusted IPIC connection

Design example: Securing client-to-CICS with an IPIC connection that uses TLS

Configuring security for IPIC

+ Security for CICS Liberty

+ Auditing CICS

+ Securing - previous doc

+ Administering

+ Developing system programs

+ Monitoring

+ Improving performance

+ Troubleshooting

# Recommendations and Best Practices

CICS security is a team sport

## - How it works: identification in CICS

Identity propagation

## - How it works: authentication in CICS

Which authentication method can I use with CICS access methods?

Passwords and passphrases

PassTickets

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

ICRX (Extended Identity Context Reference)

## + System management

## - Security reference

### - How IBM Health Checker for z/OS checks CICS security

CICS\_CEDA\_ACCESS

CICS\_JOBSUB\_SPOOL

CICS\_JOBSUB\_TDQINTRDR

CICS\_REGION\_CONFIGURATION

CICS\_RESOURCE\_CONFIGURATION

- In Liberty JVM server, to control registration with the angel process.

### Recommendation

Because the CICS region user ID is a powerful user ID, it must be protected. This user ID must be defined to RACF with the PROTECTED attribute. *Protected user IDs* cannot be used to log on to the system, and are protected from being revoked through incorrect system access attempts. This setting prevents failed password attempts that cause a denial of service attack.

simpler auditing.

### Security best practice (validated by IBM Health Checker for z/OS)

In the CICS documentation, configuration best practices that are validated by IBM Health Checker for z/OS are highlighted in boxes, like the one that surrounds this statement.

## What is the health checker?

A tool to help identify potential configuration problems before they impact availability or cause system outages

Programmatically checks the current active z/OS and sysplex settings and definitions for a system

Generates output with detailed messages to inform of any potential problems and suggested actions to take to resolve them.

IBM Health Checker for z/OS designed to encourage best practice

Report where not conforming with advice  
Part of base product since z/OS 1.7  
On by default from z/OS 2.1 (Sep 2013)

### Health Check output

Visible as option CK in SDSF  
Checks are associated with a product or subsystem  
IBM provides over 150 health checker checks  
Each check tests configuration or state information  
Result in SUCCESS, WARNING or EXCEPTION message

# ISPF option SDSF;CK

```
Display Filter View Print Options Search Help
```

---

SDSF HEALTH CHECKER DISPLAY MV2C LINE 90-111 (251)  
COMMAND INPUT ==> \_ SCROLL ==> CSR

NP	NAME	CheckOwner	State	Status	Result	Diag1	Diag2	DiagFrom	Glob
	IXGLOGR_ENTRYTHRESHOLD	IBMIXGLOGR	INACTIVE (ENABLED)	INACTIVE	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	IXGLOGR_STAGINGDSFULL	IBMIXGLOGR	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	IXGLOGR_STRUCTUREFULL	IBMIXGLOGR	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	EXCEPTION-LOW	4	00000000	00000000		NO
	JES_NJE_SECURITY	IBMJES	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	EXCEPTION-HIGH	12	00000000	00000000		NO
	JES2_UPGRADE_CKPT_LEVEL_JES2	IBMJES2	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	EXCEPTION-LOW	4	00000000	00000000		NO
	KHLJES01_SPOOL_UTIL_CRIT	IBMKHL	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		YES
	KHLJES01_SPOOL_UTIL_WARN	IBMKHL	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		YES
	KHLJOE01_JOES_UTIL_CRIT	IBMKHL	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		YES
	KHLJOE01_JOES_UTIL_WARN	IBMKHL	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		YES
	OCE_XTIOT_CHECK	IBMOCE	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	EXCEPTION-LOW	4	00000000	00000000		NO
	PDSE_SMSPDSE1	IBMPDSE	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_AIM_STAGE	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_AUDIT_CONTROLS	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_BATCHALLRACF	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	EXCEPTION-MEDIUM	8	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_CSFKEYS_ACTIVE	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_CSFSESV_ACTIVE	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	EXCEPTION-MEDIUM	8	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_FACILITY_ACTIVE	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_GRS_RNL	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_IBMUSER_REVOKED	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO
	RACF_ICHAUTAB_NONLPA	IBMRACF	ACTIVE (ENABLED)	SUCCESSFUL	0	00000000	00000000		NO

# Example of existing health check

```
Display Filter View Print Options Search Help
-----
SDSF OUTPUT DISPLAY RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION LINE 0 COLUMNS 02- 133
COMMAND INPUT ==> _ SCROLL ==> CSR
***** TOP OF DATA *****
CHECK(IBMRACF,RACF_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRATION)
SYSPLEX: PLEX2 SYSTEM: MV2C
START TIME: 02/01/2021 07:00:46.901547
CHECK DATE: 20111010 CHECK SEVERITY: MEDIUM

Certificates Expiring within 60 Days

Cert Owner Certificate Label End Date Trust Rings
-----
ID(FVRACF1) Keyring26-Default-Certificate 2013-06-30 No 0
ID(NICED) nicedcert 2018-03-14 Yes 0
ID(ASCR1) DefaultWASCert.WCLGW1 2010-12-31 Yes 1
CERTAUTH CAJAT238 2015-11-20 Yes 0
ID(JATP) ClientJAT238 2015-11-20 Yes 0
ID(PHAVERC) Havercan OpenSSL Server 2007-03-04 Yes 0
ID(FVFNT01) FVFNT01-WUI-SSL 2015-05-12 Yes 1
CERTAUTH LABEL00000000 2020-10-08 Yes 0
ID(ASCR1) DefaultWASCert.WCLRCAZ1 2010-12-31 Yes 1
ID(FVFNT13) Keyring26-Web-Server 2013-06-30 Yes 1
ID(FVFNT13) Keyring26-EJB-Container 2013-06-30 Yes 1
ID(FVFNT13) Keyring26-Default-Certificate 2013-06-30 Yes 1
ID(FVFNT05) ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdef 2010-01-16 Yes 0
```

# CICS TS V5 Checks in IBM Health Checker for z/OS

```
SDSF HEALTH CHECKER DISPLAY MV2C                               LINE 16-37 (245)
COMMAND INPUT ==>                                           SCROLL ==> CSR
NP   NAME                CheckOwner      State                Status                Result
   CICS_CEDA_ACCESS      IBMCISS        ACTIVE (ENABLED)     EXCEPTION-LOW         4
   CICS_JOB SUB_SPOOL    IBMCISS        ACTIVE (ENABLED)     EXCEPTION-LOW         4
   CICS_JOB SUB_TDQINTRDR IBMCISS        ACTIVE (ENABLED)     EXCEPTION-LOW         4
```

```
Check Reason:  Jobs can be run with regionid authority by
                unauthenticated users using the SPOOL
Check run (local time)  Jobname  ASID  Applid  Regionid  Ver  RcRn
12/21/2020 16:22:00.468705 CMAS740 0058 IYK2Z2G2 JTILLI1 0740 0803 18
12/21/2020 16:22:55.256985 CIDRBAF1 0063 IYK2ZAF1 DBEARD1 0740 0803 3
```

These checks were checking correct configuration to prevent attack by the CICSPWN PenTest tool

# New CICS Health Checks

Based on best practice reviews of customers

Cover security configuration of

- Regions definitions
- CICS resources
- CICS zFS security

Best practice advice is aimed at production or production-like regions

## Examples of checks

SEC=YES

XTRAN=YES|class

XUSER=YES

Default user can access sensitive transactions

Universal USSCONFIG access

Universal JVMPROFILE access

# New CICS Checks for IBM Health Checker for z/OS

```
SDSF HEALTH CHECKER DISPLAY MV2C LINE 16-37 (245)
COMMAND INPUT ===> SCROLL ===> CSR
NP NAME CheckOwner State Status Result
CICS_CEDA_ACCESS IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-LOW 4
CICS_JOB SUB_SPOOL IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-LOW 4
CICS_JOB SUB_TDQINTRDR IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-LOW 4
CICS_REGION_CONFIGURATION IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-HIGH 12
CICS_RESOURCE_CONFIGURATION IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-HIGH 12
CICS_RESOURCE_SECURITY IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-HIGH 12
CICS_USS_CONFIGURATION IBMCICS ACTIVE (ENABLED) EXCEPTION-HIGH 12
```

```
09/09/2020 09:16:03.232341 CIDRBAF1 005E IYK2ZAF1 DBEARD1 0740 F200 1
Exception messages:
DFHH0402 XTRAN=NO has been specified.
Warning messages:
DFHH0405 MINTLSLEVEL lower than 1.2 has been specified.

09/09/2020 09:22:26.546624 CICSR740 005A IYK2Z3B1 WHARMBY 0740 A000 1
Exception messages:
DFHH0401 SEC=NO has been specified.
```

## System programmer response

Using TLS levels lower than 1.2 does not adequately secure communications. If the affected region is used for anything other than a test environment, consider using TLS 1.2 or higher.

TLS Protocol in monitoring records †

Security Monitoring Capability

Instruction Execution Protection †

† CICS TS Open Beta

Enhancements to TLS

Scenarios and Best Practices

Monitoring and Preventing  
Threats

Simplification and Improved  
Diagnostics

## TLS Protocol in inbound performance record

```
Display Filter View Print Options Search Help
-----
SDSF OUTPUT DISPLAY CICSMOND JOB98162 DSID 110 LINE 1,720 COLUMNS 02- 157
COMMAND INPUT ----> SCROLL ----> PAGE
DFH SOCK C457 SOTLSLVL E3D3E2E5 F14BF300 TLSV1.3
DFH SOCK A320 SOCIPHER 00001301 4865
DFH TASK C430 CECMCHTP F3F9F0F6 3906
DFH TASK C431 CECMDLID F7F9F940 40404040 40404040 40404040 799
DFH TASK C432 LPARNAME D4E5E2F2 C4404040 MVS2D
DFH TASK A433 MAXTASKS 00000020 32
DFH TASK A434 CURTASKS 00000001 1
...
DFH CICS T480 PTSTART D9885F7FB11B1FA4 2021/04/08 14:04:15.737265
DFH CICS P481 PTTRANNO 0000144C 144
DFH CICS C482 PTTRAN C3E6E7D5 CWXN
DFH CICS A483 PTCOUNT 00000001 1
...
DFH CICS C112 RTYPE 404040E3 T
...
DFH STOR A105 SCUGETCT 00000006 6
...
DFH STOR A106 SCUSRHWM 00011F40 73536
...
DFH STOR A107 SCUSRSTG 00000000000021E8 8680
...
```

## TLS Protocol in outbound resource record

```
Display Filter View Print Options Search Help
-----
SDSF OUTPUT DISPLAY CICSMOND JOB98162 DSID 110 LINE 4,894 COLUMNS 02- 157
COMMAND INPUT ==> SCROLL ==> PAGE

URIMAP E3C5E2E3 E4D9C9F1 TESTURI1
CTPHER 00000035
TLSSLVL E3D3E2E5 F14BF200 TLSV1.2
WBURISPN 0000002000000001 00:00:00.000512 1
WBURISND 0000000100000001 00:00:00.000016 1

URIMAP E3C5E2E3 E4D9C9F2 TESTURI2
CTPHER 00001301
TLSSLVL E3D3E2E5 F14BF300 TLSV1.3
WBURISPN 0000000500000001 00:00:00.000080 1
WBURISND 0000000100000001 00:00:00.000016 1

NO WEBSERVICE RESOURCE ENTRIES

-----FIELD-NAME-----UNINTERPRETED-----INTERPRETED-----
TRAN C3E2C8D8 CSHQ
USERID C7C2F1F2 F2F04040 GB1220
TTYE E4400000 U
START D9871BEBD26E696A 2021/04/07 13:56:36.032230
STOP D9885FF21EFB0E02 2021/04/08 14:06:15.724976
TRANNUM 0000030C 30
```

## Security Monitoring Capability

XS security domain had no stats monitoring fields

When introduced in 1992

- Most requests were 3270 signon
- Only password/passtickets
- Request on RO TCB
- Used DES encryption

Security advances mean XS handles more authentication types

Password/Passphrases with KFDAES, MFA , Kerberos, certificates, ...

CPU and elapsed time authenticating has increased greatly.

To avoid bottlenecks requests cannot now all go through the RO TCB

Open TCBs are used or attached, increasing usage of TCBs

TCBs (and probably ESM requests) consume 24-bit storage.

# New Security Statistics

## User

Average timeout reuse time. . . . . : 00:00:00.00000  
Time out reuse count. . . . . : 4,652  
Time out expiry count . . . . . : 218  
Directory reuse count . . . . . : 16,118  
Directory not found count . . . . . : 0  
Delete count due to sign off. . . . . : 210  
Delete count due to ENF . . . . . : 5

Current instances in directory. . . . : 102  
Peak instances in directory . . . . . : 313  
Current instances in timeout. . . . . : 50  
Peak instances in timeout . . . . . : 102  
ENF events matched. . . . . : 5  
ENF events not matched. . . . . : 0

## Security

New ACEEs with ICRX . . . . . : 0  
Current ACEEs with ICRX . . . . . : 0  
Peak ACEEs with ICRX. . . . . : 0

New ACEEs without ICRX. . . . . : 102  
Current ACEEs without ICRX. . . . . : 102  
Peak ACEEs without ICRX . . . . . : 313

Successful fastpath authentications : 6,012  
Successful fullpath authentications : 303  
Successful kerberos authentications : 0  
Successful JWT creations . . . . . : 0  
Successful JWT authentications . . . : 0

Failed fullpath authentications . . . : 27  
Failed kerberos authentications . . . : 0  
Failed JWT creations . . . . . : 0  
Failed JWT authentications . . . . . : 0

Successful resource authorizations : 8,065  
Successful command authorizations . : 234  
Successful surrogate authorizations : 1,040  
Successful non-CICS authorizations : 0

Failed resource authorizations . . . : 2  
Failed command authorizations . . . . : 1  
Failed surrogate authorizations . . . : 1  
Failed non-CICS authorizations . . . . : 0

Max parallel ESM requests . . . . . : 16  
Current parallel ESM requests . . . . : 0  
Peak parallel ESM requests . . . . . : 16

Max waiting ESM requests . . . . . : 9,999  
Current waiting ESM requests . . . . . : 0  
Peak waiting ESM requests . . . . . : 24

# New Monitoring for Security

435	XSVFYPWD	The total elapsed time that the user task spent verifying passwords, password phrases, PassTickets, and MFA tokens
438	XSVFYBAS	The total elapsed time that the user task spent verifying basic authentication tokens
439	XSVFYKER	The total elapsed time that the user task spent verifying Kerberos tokens
440	XSVFYJWT	The total elapsed time that the user task spent verifying JSON web tokens

435 refers to EXEC CICS VERIFY PASSWORD/PHRASE and EXEC CICS SIGNON  
438-40 refer to EXEC CICS VERIFY TOKEN

## Instruction Execution Protection

### Executable storage

58B0	4104	5820	B000
58B0	2004	50B0	41FC
58E0	4110	50E0	4244
58F0	3EF0	4110	41F0

### Protected storage

E685	9393	4084	9695
855A	4040	E896	A440
8381	9540	9985	8184
40C5	C2C3	C4C9	C34B

## Objectives

Separates data storage from program storage

Prevents code from being executed on data storage

Prevents buffer overflow exploits

### Hidden code in data

C889	8484	8595	4083
9684	857A	50B0	41FC
58E0	4110	50E0	4244
58F0	3EF0	4110	41F0

## Software and Hardware Prereqs

z/OS 2.4 or z/OS 2.3 + APARs

z14 or higher

## z/OS Externals

STORAGE OBTAIN and RELEASE

EXECUTABLE={YES|NO}

IARV64 GETSTOR

EXECUTABLE={SYSTEM\_RULES|YES|NO}

EXECUTABLE ignored if hardware or software does not support IEP

# DSA Usage in CICS TS Open Beta

DSA	Usage
RDSA/ERDSA	Reentrant programs
SDSA/ESDSA	Shared USER key storage and USER key programs
CDSA/ECDSA	CICS key storage and CICS key programs
UDSA/EUDSA	User key storage

DSA	Usage
RDSA/ERDSA	Reentrant programs
PUDSA/EPUDSA	USER key programs
PCDSA/EPCDSA	CICS key programs
SDSA/ESDSA	Shared USER key storage
CDSA/ECDSA	CICS key storage
UDSA/EUDSA	USER key storage

Storage is either **executable** or **data** (non executable)

Try to execute code in EUDSA  
(normal getmained storage)

C889	8484	8595	4083
9684	857A	50B0	41FC
58E0	4110	50E0	4244
58F0	3EF0	4110	41F0

# New IEP Program Check

## Protection exception (0c4)

Kernel ESTAE will identify 0c4 as IEP program check

Error code 0c4/**akes**

PSW will be pointing to next instruction

BEAR will contain last branch address

Exception trace call for this program check

New message (IEP 0c4)

## API option

EXEC CICS GETMAIN EXECUTABLE

## XPI option

SMMC GETMAIN EXECUTEABLE(YES)

## GLUE and TRUE work areas

ENABLE PROGRAM GAEXECUTABLE

ENABLE PROGRAM TAEXECUTABLE

## Native assembler dynamic storage

Specify DFHEIENT DATA\_EXECUTEABLE=YES

If you really need to make data areas executable

API , XPI and definitions

Primarily intended for ISVs

Require SYSEIB

# Enabling IEP

Opt in

feature toggles:

`com.ibm.cics.sm.iep=true`

`com.ibm.cics.ap.syseib.unprotected=true`

Allows ISVs and Customers  
to check if they execute code in data storage

Improved information for security failures †

Removal of security definitions for CAT 1 transactions †

† CICS TS Open Beta

Enhancements to TLS

Scenarios and Best Practices

Monitoring and Preventing Threats

Simplification and Improved Diagnostics

## Improved information for security failures

Currently the following messages show when there is a security violation

Problems can often occur if for example

The userid is a functional userid

The transaction is started on another region

How can you identify the end user

```
DFHXS1111 02/24/2021 15:21:29 IYK2ZOX3 CSMI Security violation by user LEW for resource
JAT251.DFHQUERY in class SURROGAT. SAF codes
are (X'00000008',X'00000000'). ESM codes are (X'00000008',X'00000000'). RACF request made was
FASTAUTH.
```

```
11.27.16 JOB78114 ICH408I USER(LEW ) GROUP(TSOUSER ) NAME(LEWIS H JAMES ) 153
153 JAT251.DFHQUERY CL(SURROGAT)
153 INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY
153 FROM JAT* (G)
153 ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )
```

A new DFHXS1117 message will accompany DFHXS1111 messages

Available origin data information will be output

Information will vary depending on entry point

Distributed Identity will be reported if available

Example message from a web request

```
DFHXS1117 03/11/2021 09:43:27 IYK2ZOX3 CSMI Security violation originated from applid IYK2ZOX1 client  
IP address 9.145.169.58 port 53619 facility LEWURI TCPIPSERVICE LEWTCP transaction CWBA user  
LEWISJA link user LEW.
```

Example message from a terminal transaction originating in a TOR

```
DFHXS1117 03/11/2021 09:43:27 IYK2ZOX3 CSMI Security violation originated from applid IYK2ZOX1 client  
IP address 9.145.169.58 port 53649 facility T135 transaction CECI user LEWISJA link user LEW.
```

## Removal of security definitions for CAT 1 transactions

### Problem

Creating CAT 1 security definitions problematic and time consuming

Required for all region userids

New transactions missed

Complications of SECPRFX

New CAT 1 transaction in service always cause problems

### Requirement

Only the region userid is allowed to run CAT 1 transactions

#### CICS knows

- The region userid

- The CAT 1 transactions

- How a transaction is started

... so why ask the ESM ?

Removing the ESM check makes it more secure

Not possible to misconfigure

ESM no longer called for CAT 1 transactions

Internal security checking to check

Abend AXS1 if check fails

DFH£CAT1 CLIST removed

Mentioned in Auditor section of CICS's Doc  
to ensure auditors are aware

# Links

IBM Documentation for CICS TS 5.6 and CICS TS Open Beta

<https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/cics-ts>

CICS TS Open Beta Announce (9<sup>th</sup> July 2021)

<https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6360807>

CICS TS Community feedback on open beta

<https://ibm.biz/cicstsopenbeta>

RFE (Request for Enhancement)

<https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rfe/>

620 separate RFEs already delivered against CICS TS V5.